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EUROPE’S EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY: 
BETWEEN GEOPOLITICS AND THE MARKET 
RICHARD YOUNGS
∗ 
During the last three years the EU has agreed a series of policy papers and new strategies in the 
field of energy security. European governments and European Commissioners routinely stress 
their belief that Europe’s energy predicament is acute and cite energy security as a priority issue 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Policy commitments stress that energy strategy is 
to move beyond the internal sphere and become systematically a part of EU external relations. 
The Commission’s pivotal 2006 Energy Green Paper promised “a better integration of energy 
objectives into broader relations with third countries”.
1 
And indeed a plethora of new energy agreements, partnerships, dialogues and treaties have been 
forthcoming. The EU has signed agreements on energy cooperation with Ukraine in December 
2005, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 2006 and has offered a similar partnership to Algeria and 
Egypt. In October 2005, the Energy Community South East Europe Treaty was signed, with the 
aim of incorporating Balkan states into the European regional market for gas and petroleum 
products. A Commission-led Black Sea and Caspian Sea energy cooperation initiative is also 
taking shape. EU-OPEC dialogue has deepened. An EU-Africa energy partnership is being 
developed. Energy is now a prominent issue in nearly all the EU’s external political dialogues, 
whereas it barely appeared on the agenda five years ago. 
But do these new energy initiatives amount to much? Has energy really been fully and 
coherently integrated into EU foreign policy? Has the EU adopted qualitatively new approaches 
to energy security or simply piled one formal strategy on top of another without meaningful 
change? 
This paper makes four arguments that follow in sequence. First, the EU’s stated approach to 
energy security can be described as revolving around the concept of a ‘market-governance’ 
nexus. Second, European governments and EU institutions espouse this approach while 
harbouring concerns that in practice a more geopolitical approach is required. Third, such 
concern is amplified by the increasing resistance to the EU’s ‘market-governance’ model on the 
part of several key energy producer states. Fourth, despite inching towards a more geo-strategic 
approach, the EU remains insufficiently engaged with the political issues that impinge upon 
energy interests in producer states. In sum, the EU currently hovers ineffectively between 
markets and geopolitics, where it needs more effectively to conjoin these two necessary strands 
of energy security. 
1. Extending  ‘market-governance’ 
It is clear that the internal market is the crucial bedrock of the EU’s external energy policies. 
The EU’s stated approach to energy security is predicated on the spread eastwards and 
southwards of internal European market rules.  
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The March 2006 Green Paper argues that energy security can best be achieved through a “pan-
European energy community”, a “common regulatory space” around Europe. This is said to 
require “[r]einforced market-based provisions on energy…in the EU’s existing and future 
agreements with third countries”.
2 The Green Paper asserts that as a guiding philosophy, “[i]t 
would be a mistake to pay too much attention to the geographical or national origin of today’s 
oil imports. In reality, the EU depends…on a global oil market”. 
The Commission asserts that energy security can be achieved “by the EU extending its own 
energy market to include its neighbours within a common regulatory area with shared trade, 
transit and environmental rules”: “We need to convince non-EU consumer countries that world 
energy markets can work for them. If they were to conclude that the only route to security lay in 
bilateral deals, the risk of disruption of the energy system would grow”.
3 
The Commission’s 2007 Strategic Energy Review stresses the search for international 
partnerships based on “shared rules or principles derived from EU [internal] energy policy” and 
the need to promote ‘transparent legal frameworks’ in producer states.
4 Crucially, in its high-
profile September 2007 ‘unbundling’ proposal (to break up the production and distribution of 
energy) the Commission reiterates the importance of internal market rules facilitating rules-
based influence over third country producers. In short, the EU espouses a combination of 
market and governance principles that might be termed a ‘market-governance’ nexus.  
This is conceived as being more than simply a free market model, but rather an apparently clear 
example of the EU reproducing its own constituent norms – now widely recognised as central to 
the EU’s international identity. It would be exaggerated to say that the aim is a wholesale export 
of the internal market, but the logic is to extend as many of its rules as are political and 
economically feasible outside EU structures.  
The overarching aim is said to be the development of inter-connecting energy systems between 
different geographical areas, based on EU regulatory norms and the acquis, as a means of 
transcending the so far partial technical cooperation pursued separately with individual partner 
states.
5 The EU’s basic goal is to extend the principles of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
successively to the different areas of the EU’s periphery, from Russia, through Central Asia and 
the South Caucasus, Ukraine, the Balkans and into the southern Mediterranean.  
The EU’s new energy treaties and agreements across the range of different third countries are 
said to be about ‘extending the EU’s energy norms and infrastructure’ as the main solution to 
security concerns: 
•  Following Russia’s rejection of the ECT, the EU has sought various alternative avenues to 
persuade Russia to adhere to at least some of the Charter’s market-governance principles. 
The EU-Russia energy dialogue, which commenced in 2000, has aimed at enhancing 
infrastructure connections, including through Tacis funding. In 2002 an EU-Russia 
Technology Centre was created in Moscow, bringing together industry representatives. 
From 2003 the formal aim was enunciated of extending the internal European energy 
market to Russia. A focus on practical cooperation, avoiding sensitive political questions, 
was reinforced by the agreement in 2003 to reorganise EU-Russia relations around four 
‘common spaces.’ The EU linked its support for Russian WTO accession to Moscow’s 
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assent to “favour the growing integration of the continent’s energy markets”.
6 The focus 
has recently been on incorporating some ECT principles into any successor to the now-
expiring Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). 
•  To the south, the Commission’s new Mediterranean aid programme for 2007-13 identifies 
as priority areas for funding the integration of European and Maghrebi gas markets; 
support for extension of the Energy Community Treaty to the southern Mediterranean; 
and integration of Libyan energy markets into the broader EMP regional framework.
7  
•  Similarly, the Energy Community South East Europe Treaty extends the EU energy 
acquis to the Balkans and coordinates infrastructure linkages, with World Bank financial 
support.
8  The Energy Community is a process that aims to extend the EU internal energy 
market to the South East Europe region. It aims to create a legal and economic framework 
in relation to ‘Network Energy’. The main goals are to create a stable and regulatory 
market framework capable of attracting investment; to create a single regulatory space for 
trade; to enhance security of supply; to improve the environmental situation and to 
develop electricity and gas market competition on a broader geographical scale.  
•  According to Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy reflects the country’s ‘geo-strategic location and energy 
resources.’
9 Under its energy partnership with the EU Azerbaijan commits itself to 
adopting an independent energy regulatory authority and independent transmission system 
operators both along the lines of European market-governance models.
10  
In 2004, the EU also launched the Baku Initiative, which incorporates the Commission, 
the Caspian littoral states and their neighbours, with the declared aim of developing 
regional energy markets and network interconnections in the Caspian and Central Asia. 
The EU’s stated objective is to drive energy sector reform in the region, around EU 
regulatory standards – once again using Europe’s internal market as a template. The Baku 
Initiative is based on a trade off: European funding and investment for infrastructure 
development in return for a guarantee of supplies to European markets.
11 New EBRD 
funds have been offered to Caspian Basin states, along with an increased €500 million of 
EIB lending, for energy connection and reforms.  
The Commission’s new Black Sea initiative similarly aims at the progressive integration 
of this region into the European energy market. In late 2006 the Commission proposed 
plans to move towards ‘sub-regional energy markets’ in the Caspian Basin, Caucasus and 
Central Asia, through a new EU-Black Sea-Caspian Sea Common Energy House. Policy 
here will be based on prompting and supporting the convergence of these energy markets 
with that of the EU, with the ambitious aim of having this whole broader region 
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“functioning on the basis of the EU internal energy market”.
12 The Commission has 
proposed that this initiative have its own secretariat and be funded from the ENPI. The 
new EU-Central Asia strategy agreed under the German presidency in June 2007 
proposed a new formal energy dialogue that would work towards a new ‘transport 
corridor’ and the extension of EU internal energy market principles. 
•  In Africa, energy partnership is understood through the lens of development policy and 
governance issues. The EU Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable 
Development was launched in 2002, aimed at improving access to energy as part of 
poverty reduction strategies. One instrument agreed under this Initiative is the 220 million 
euro Energy Facility, to support projects strengthening energy delivery to rural areas. The 
October 2005 EU Strategy for Africa (p. 5 & 37) attaches priority to the funding of 
regional energy infrastructure, including links between sub-Saharan and North Africa.  
The 2005 statement on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) commits the EU to 
strengthen twinning programmes in the energy sphere, the coordination of regulatory 
frameworks, regional cooperation and the integration of energy into poverty reduction 
programmes.
13 In October 2006, energy cooperation was for the first time identified 
explicitly as a priority focal area for the €23 billion European Development Fund (EDF) 
budget. An updated review of EU-Africa cooperation issued in April 2007 advocates 
more efforts in the extension of internal market principles to Africa, as part of an Africa-
EU Energy Alliance.
14 In 2007 new dialogue commenced in Brussels between the EU and 
China on Africa with the declared aim – on the European side – of getting China signed 
up to market rules. This was judged to be the means to bringing down the energy prices 
Beijing was offering across Africa which were squeezing medium-sized European 
companies out of the African market.  
Across these varied regions, diplomats insist that the internal market both defines the EU’s 
substantive approach to energy security and (in a classic case of spill-over) ensures that member 
states’ bilateral foreign policies are converging around a unified set of guiding principles. 
Policy-makers argue that the internal market leaves increasingly little room for market-
distorting bilateral deals. Reflecting the EU’s unique nature as an (intra-European) international 
body itself devising an (extra-European) international policy, its ‘external’ policy extends the 
nature of ‘internal’ cooperation already developed between member states.  
Internal competition laws have obliged a number of reforms that determine important substance 
of foreign policy. One example is the scrapping of traditional ‘destination clauses’ in third 
country agreements. These clauses enabled producer states to prevent a buyer passing on surplus 
supplies to other states and thus protect the exclusivity of bilateral contracts – something 
contrary to the basic tenets of the EU internal market. Their demise permits a more flexible 
switching of supplies between member states, a contribution to better energy security.
15  
The dispersal of market power is often conceived as integral to security of supply. Market 
liberalisation is also widely perceived to be the EU’s most potent negotiating tool in 
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international energy negotiations. The Commission argues in its January 2007 Strategic Energy 
Review that it is by opening up its own markets that the EU can best hope to gain FDI access to 
countries such as Russia. The breaking apart of national energy champions within Europe would 
make it harder for large non-European firms, like Gazprom, to negotiate their way into 
dominant positions simply through a small number of bilateral deals.  
Moreover, large scale LNG capacities developed in particular by the British and Spanish offer 
the prospect of huge increases in Algerian, Qatari and Norwegian gas coming in the UK and 
Spain and then –assuming full internal market liberalisation – onto other European markets too, 
striking at Gazprom’s dominant position. In this sense, diplomats frequently concede that 
completing the internal market is a prerequisite to the EU being able to put in place a common 
external dimension to its energy policy. 
Stressing the market-governance nexus, the internal market’s centrality in rooting Europe’s 
international projection is presented as orienting the EU towards energy strategies based on far-
reaching rules-based governance reform. Benita Ferrero-Waldner claims that the EU’s ‘added 
value’ to external energy policies is to ensure that rule of law principles prevail through 
“enhanced legal framework[s]”.
16 The series of new energy partnerships – signed with Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan – represent a familiar EU-style approach of attempting to use 
contractual agreements to attain adherence to rules-based behaviour on market regulations, 
transport and safety.  
Officials also argue that rules-based governance offers the most promising way to deal with the 
rise of new energy consumers, such as India and China: European energy strategy seeks to 
entice these states into an international energy regime based around common regulatory and 
governance norms, to undercut the ability of such ‘rising powers’ to resort to untrammeled 
political deal-making.  
Diplomats likewise insist that the Energy Charter is important primarily because of its focus on 
the rule of law and the role of governments in providing robust frameworks for foreign 
investment in the energy sector. In this way the Commission argues that the export of European 
standards and norms is the key to ensuring both consistency with human rights aims and 
improving conditions for EU investment in producer states.
17 The Director General of DG Relex 
(External Relations) at the European Commission insists that good governance has become an 
integral aspect of external energy polices.
18  
The Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched by then British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002, is often said to 
represent a key link between energy security and good governance policies. The EITI aims to 
gain commitments from multinationals to publish details of their payments in producer states, as 
a means of reducing the scope for bribery. The EITI has seen an effort to reduce resource-linked 
corruption in particular in Nigeria, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.  
European policy-makers see in this market-governance approach a clear difference with US 
energy security strategy. Many US commentators have highlighted the degree to which the 
Bush administration has injected a ‘hard security’ dimension into energy policy. They observe 
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that the US approach is based on the increasing use of military deployments and partnerships to 
protect and guarantee energy supplies – from West Africa, Central Asia, through to the Middle 
East.
19 European policy-makers are united in professing a less directly securitised approach to 
energy. It is notable that energy is not enmeshed within European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) decision-making.  
2. Precarious  principles 
Such is the declared approach. And the market-governance strategy would certainly seem to 
have been imbued with sufficient substance to render it more than purely declaratory. But, of 
course, much recent debate has focused on the well-known divisions that persist within the 
European Union over the role of market liberalisation. Debates over internal market reforms 
have been extensively covered; this paper is concerned with the degree to which these have 
impacted upon external policies. Crucially, this internal-external spill-over has deepened. At the 
same time as advocating and proclaiming the market-governance approach, different parts of the 
EU foreign policy system have in practice reined back efforts to base energy security on the 
extension of internal market norms. Member state governments and EU institutions harbour two 
crucial sets of doubts. 
First, contrary to formal EU rhetoric, some fairly fundamental doubts persist over market 
norms. If the internal market is supposed to set the foundations for a rules-based, market-
oriented external energy policy, this logic is undermined by the determination of a number of 
member states to curtail the liberalisation of energy markets within Europe.  
In 2006, the Commission criticised all governments except the Dutch for failing to meet market 
opening commitments they had already signed up to. High-profile cases such as Spain’s 
hindrance of  E.ON’s bid for Endesa have dominated headlines. Beyond these, analysts lament a 
broader return to ‘economic nationalism’ within Europe.
20 While paying lip service to its 
support for ‘completing the internal market’, the French government has blocked proposed new 
EU regulations that would tighten enforcement mechanisms and speed up the implementation of 
liberalising reforms.
21 After President Sarkozy pushed the controversial Suez-Gaz de France 
merger to completion, Europe minister Jean-Pierre Jouyet declared that this creation of a new 
national champion represented a “vision of what could be the energy policy for Europe”. At the 
time of writing, several member states still reject the Commission’s flagship ‘unbundling’ 
proposal. The internal energy market remains very much less than unified, despite the formal 
freeing up of internal gas prices in July 2007. Linked to this, basic infrastructural links are still 
absent between member states. 
Significantly for this paper’s focus on foreign policy dimensions, this situation has direct 
ramifications on external strategy. The absence of both pan-European market mechanisms and 
sufficient physical interconnections prevents the EU from responding as a single entity to 
external energy shocks. Critics argue that this renders premature expectations of a coherent 
foreign policy.  
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Market-doubters also stress the differences between oil and gas markets, reiterating scepticism 
that the latter can develop the fungibility of international oil flows. They commonly warn that 
market deepening would mean increased price volatility, to the detriment of energy security.  
The French proposal for an Energy Special Representative was openly aimed at the goal of 
circumventing free market supporters within the Commission in favour of a more government-
led, geopolitical approach to energy security internationally.
22 Within most member states 
foreign ministries have sought to wrest influence from energy ministries for similar reasons.    
French, Spanish, Italian and German positions tend not to oppose market principles outright but 
rather argue that liberalisation should be matched by negotiated reciprocity in producer states. 
Contrary to much reporting, they insist that their position reflects not an existential rejection of 
the market but the fact that they start from a different position in terms of the structure of state-
firm relations and the vested interests that must therefore be taken into account. It is the 
condition of reciprocity that has now been formally enshrined in Commission proposals and 
dubbed ‘the Gazprom clause’. 
Bilateral deals remain the preferred means of securing such negotiated reciprocity. Most 
member states, and indeed the Commission, extol the virtues of long-term negotiated contracts. 
A number of governments admit that if anything their political intervention and backing for 
such deals is becoming stronger and more overt. They argue that removing the carrot of 
downstream access within Europe would make it harder for EU governments to win upstream 
access in producer states. And a number of member states reject even the notion of basic 
transparency and information-sharing between EU member states on such bilateral deals.  
Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus concurred that while Russia in particular insisted on 
approaching energy in such an overtly geopolitical manner, the EU needed to respond in kind 
and drop the ‘mantra’ that the market would provide for Europe’s energy security.
23 In private 
many member state diplomats opine that while they feel bound to go along with the EU’s 
market rhetoric, such an approach is in practice increasingly unrealistic, in light of a more 
difficult geopolitical context. In contrast, the UK criticises the demand that liberalisation be 
reciprocal as a pretext for protectionism.  
High Representative Javier Solana has warned that, “we should avoid thinking that enumerating 
a list of principles is a substitute for a policy” and that there “is no such thing as a single 
solution” to the complex international politics of energy security. Market liberalisation, he 
opined, is “only part of the answer”.
24 An incipient battle for control over external energy policy 
between the Commission and Council is described by insiders as one between the competing 
approaches of ‘markets and politics.’  
What many take to represent ‘the European approach’ of extending internal market networks is 
far from being a rationalised philosophy of energy security, but is simply the area in which the 
Commission has enjoyed energy-related competence and thus the inevitable focus of Brussels 
proposals so far. As the Council is becoming more deeply engaged in the geopolitics of energy 
security, this has already begun to change. The ‘energy technocrats’ complain that too much 
alliance-oriented foreign policy is already infecting the coherence of EU strategies. 
A second set of doubts relates to the balance between the internal and external dimensions of 
energy security. Despite all the formal rhetoric to the contrary, in private many policy-makers in 
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energy ministries still talk in terms of energy security being a matter of reducing external 
dependencies, rather than strengthening international market inter-dependencies. The foreign 
policy dimension of energy strategy has been increasingly eclipsed by the focus on climate 
change and the broader environmental dimensions of energy security. 
The 2007 Strategic Review was most notable for the Commission proposal for a 20% unilateral 
European reduction of carbon emissions by 2020. New European Investment Bank funding 
available for the development of renewable energy technologies dwarfs external energy funding. 
Climate change is a more easily definable and identifiable issue that has captured public 
attention and driven policy changes in a way that the more diffuse external-geopolitical 
challenges of energy security have failed to do.
25  
To some degree the internal and external dimensions of energy security are quite properly 
pursued in parallel. But some tension also exists between them. Most notably, the priority 
attached to reducing external dependencies cuts across talk of ‘mutually-beneficial energy 
partnership’ with producer state governments. The latter judge the EU to be increasingly intent 
on undercutting their influence, when in return for supply commitments to European markets 
they seek ‘energy demand roadmaps’ from the EU as the basis of predictable interdependence. 
Security players are right to warn that this risks taking the focus away from the short-term 
challenges of international geopolitics and fomenting the illusion that investment in renewables 
can obviate the need to take difficult foreign policy choices.  
In short, many member states in practice continue to conceive of energy security as a state-led 
responsibility both within and beyond Europe. EU governments seek to direct producer 
governments to increase production capacity for European security, more than they seem 
willing in practice to trust in market mechanisms.  
One European diplomat terms the EU model as one of “regulated liberalisation”; another as “a 
third way…between markets and geopolitics”, predicated upon “political dialogue and 
cooperation”. One of the EU’s particularly senior producer-state interlocutors observes that the 
EU is no less “egotistically geopolitical” than any other international actor, but seeks to dress its 
geopolitics in the finer cloaks of rules-based discourse.  
3.  Where the market doesn’t reach 
A further question is whether the stated approach of norm-based energy governance is accepted 
by or attractive to producer states. Many argue that it is in the spread of its own regulatory 
norms that the EU’s own most successful influence and comparative advantage lies. But in 
energy policy this is not demonstrably the case.  In fact, resistance has strengthened in many, if 
not most, of the EU’s main energy suppliers to the ‘import’ of EU energy-pertinent norms. In 
many places the market-governance approach appears to have little traction. 
This is perhaps most conspicuously the case in the Arabian Peninsula, which still accounts for 
by far the largest share of global oil reserves. The Commission has proposed extending its idea 
for both an ENP Energy Treaty and the Euro-Med Common Energy House to Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states, as well as offering the latter the kind of energy agreement signed with 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. A small amount of funding is available for energy co-
operation projects in such middle-income states under the new 2007-13 EU budget.
26 
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But EU-GCC free trade area talks have been running for 18 years without conclusion. The EU 
proposed a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation; the GCC states rejected the 
idea, insisting that a free trade agreement was the precursor to deepening other areas of 
cooperation. Even after Saudi Arabia’s entry into the WTO at the end of 2005, the GCC remains 
far from accepting EU-style market and governance norms. Gulf states berate the EU for 
thinking rigidly in terms of exporting its own model of regional integration, without recognising 
that intra-regional dynamics are quite different within the GCC.  
GCC states complain that the EU has an overly narrow, regulatory-based approach to energy, 
when they seek energy cooperation that flows from a broader strategic partnership capable of 
offsetting US power, especially in relation to the Arab-Israel conflict.
27 With the standard EU 
instruments of technical aid cooperation and regulatory convergence failing to take root in the 
Gulf, energy cooperation remains limited. British and French bilateral deals and political 
engagement still predominate. Paris planned to sign a bilateral energy treaty with Saudi Arabia 
in 2007. 
Of course, in two countries – Iran and Iraq – the issue of energy security has clearly been 
eclipsed by other challenges, with the result that efforts to develop contractual, rules-based 
energy partnerships have been hesitant or compromised. In Iran the EU has pursued an 
increasingly tough stance towards non-proliferation despite the country’s potential importance 
as an energy supplier. Energy security might even be seen as being at odds with the EU’s 
nuclear policy in the rather direct sense that if Iran were to develop a nuclear energy capability 
it would have more gas available for export.  
Here there does appear to have been some increasingly joined-up thinking. One part of the 
incentives offered to Iran in return for abandoning its nuclear programme includes European 
technological assistance in the energy sector. But, beyond the impressive European unity on 
WMD, increasing muddle has prevailed over energy policy towards Iran. The British 
government has discouraged Shell from investing in the Islamic Republic; the French 
government for a long time offered strong support for Total’s desire to invest in Iran (although 
it appears that this support is being withdrawn under President Sarkozy). Italy and other states 
have openly backed the Nabucco pipeline project as a means of brining Iranian gas into EU 
markets; the UK wants no official EU backing for Nabucco. At the time of this writing, new 
divisions had emerged after the tightening of sanctions against Iran between France and the UK, 
on the one hand, and Germany and Italy, on the other. The whole viability and desirability of 
integrating Iran into an EU-led regional energy community are contested within the EU – while 
the current direction of Iranian foreign policy hardly renders it more propitious anyway.  
Even in the EU’s immediate periphery the reach of internal market-governance norms 
sometimes looks distinctly limited. Algeria has rejected the whole edifice of governance norms 
incorporated into the Neighbourhood action plan offered to it. Spanish officials feel that North 
Africa has been neglected within overall EU energy security and have pressed Algeria to show 
Spain ‘preferential treatment’ in energy supplies over other European consumers and proposed a 
bilateral ‘energy partnership’. Despite this, in September 2007 Algeria revoked its €5 billion 
contract with Repsol and Gas Natural. The French also admit that the bilateral dimension 
continues to predominate in relations with Algeria, with Paris signing a new bilateral energy 
treaty with Algeria in 2006.  
Already well covered in analysis of EU policies is the declining place of market-governance 
norms in strategy towards Russia. Russian officials continue to be resistant to EU efforts to 
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‘smuggle in’ ECT principles to a new agreement. The growing belief among a majority of 
member states is that Russia in turn must be approached through an essentially geopolitical lens. 
One official acknowledges that, whatever the EU’s formal language on cooperation and market 
integration, the primary need is to curtail Russia’s power over its neighbours and that this is 
where ‘geopolitics comes in’. Nearly all member states’ energy companies have signed bilateral 
deals with Gazprom. The EU now has more high-level political dialogue with Russia than with 
any other third country except the United States; in contrast, the depth of ‘network’ inter-
linkages and integration is less than elsewhere in the East as Russia has shown increasing 
disinterest in adopting European norms and standards. At Russia’s behest and unlike ENP 
action plans, the four common spaces make no mention of the incorporation of EU governance 
rules and standards. In practice, the EU eventually acquiesced to an exemption for the energy 
sector in Russia’s accession to the WTO. One expert parodies that in terms of extending market-
governance the common spaces are “as empty as the word ‘space’ implies”.
28  
Similar trends can be witnessed across the Caspian and Central Asia. In negotiations for its ENP 
action plan, Azerbaijan only accepted a non-specific and diluted commitment on joining the 
WTO. The Aliyev government sees market liberalisation as unnecessary due to the country’s 
energy resources – this position resisting a central pillar of the EU’s energy security philosophy. 
Kazakhstan has resisted an embrace of EU regulatory and market norms while it has no prospect 
of a place in the ENP. President Nazerbayev’s ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy has recently led him 
into new strategic, long-term bilateral deals with Russia. As one diplomat notes: Central Asian 
regimes are increasingly asking Europe for direct and concrete contracts, underpinned by geo-
strategic preference, while the EU is asking them “to buy into the more abstract notion of a 
market distribution system”.  
With Gazprom offering increased prices for Central Asian gas and new infrastructure 
investments, the incentives have diminished for Central Asians to buy into a broadly defined 
‘European market-governance area’. What states in the region want most dearly is first, 
European support, against the United States, for (more economical) pipeline routes through 
Iran; and second, a more systematic incorporation into EU policy-making of Turkey, as both a 
weightier diplomatic player in Central Asia and a potentially vital transit hub for the region’s 
energy experts.  
Finally, the extension of internal market norms to Africa is also subject to strong debate and 
significant doubts within the European Union. If in Africa the approach to energy security is 
supposed to be consistent with reducing ‘energy poverty’, the role of market principles in this 
linkage is contested. Development experts and officials remain concerned that development 
needs risk being undermined by market reforms aimed in practice at enhancing Europe’s access 
to those energy resources needed within Africa itself. African governments complain that what 
they want from Europe are long term commitments to buy more significant amounts of oil and 
gas from Africa, not ‘abstract partnerships’.  
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is conspicuously not Europeanised. Currently 
only four member states – the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands – have signed up to 
the EITI. Financial support for the EITI has been forthcoming from only the UK ($5.5 million), 
Dutch ($1 million) and German ($0.5 million) governments. While repeating ritually that EITI 
is a good initiative, most European governments admit to blocking proposals to exert strong and 
united EU pressure on states such as Russia, Algeria, Angola, Libya, Qatar or UAE to sign up – 
at present the EITI only incorporates states accounting for about 5-10% of world production, 
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excluding for example the whole of the Middle East. The EU has resisted the notion of attaching 
conditionality to governments’ performance on the more transparent management of energy 
revenues.  
4. Underplaying  politics 
There is a connected parallel to this limited reach of market-governance norms, that represents 
the most serious shortcoming of European policy, namely the almost apolitical flavour of EU 
energy security strategy.   
The Commission has stated that energy security policy “must also be consistent with the EU’s 
broader foreign policy objectives such as conflict prevention and resolution, non-proliferation 
and promoting human rights”.
29 But in practice decisions over European peace support, 
democracy and human rights policies – where to pursue or not to pursue such values – remain 
strikingly disconnected from energy policy. 
Across different producer regions the mismatch is increasingly evident between Europe’s 
narrowly-delineated approach to energy, on the one hand, and the shifting impact of political 
factors, on the other hand. 
In North Africa under the EMP technical cooperation on energy has strengthened and a raft of 
new energy infrastructure links funded. But EU policy seems to limit itself to such measures 
and declines to devise a strategy for addressing the way in which North African politics impacts 
upon security interests. In the summer of 2006, the Algerian government reversed a tentative 
liberalisation of the energy sector as a means for President Bouteflika to shore up his support 
with oil clans, amid rumours that he might be pushed out of office.
30 Algeria’s March 2007 
energy price hike against Spain, as well as the September cancellation of the Repsol-Gas 
Natural contract, reflects a new assertiveness and ‘payback’ for the Zapatero government’s 
markedly more pro-Moroccan stance on the Western Sahara. As the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat launched a new campaign of violence in early 2007 by first attacking 
foreign oil workers, the illusion has been shattered that Algeria’s limited process of political 
liberalisation had sufficed definitively to resolve conflict. Yet these are issues absent from the 
energy partnership the EU has offered to Algeria. 
Similarly, in the Arabian peninsula, officials admit that there has been no debate on how the 
EU’s new energy strategy will impact on the political dimensions of European relations with the 
Gulf monarchies. European diplomats still commonly suggest that Gulf states are authoritarian 
but ‘well run’ and that their internal politics present no concerns for EU energy supplies. The 
EU has approached energy security in a compartmentalised fashion, divorced from both broader 
Gulf security issues and any understanding of the way in which Gulf states and societies are fast 
changing. Diplomats reveal that many in the EU favour developing relations on an EU-OPEC 
rather than EU-GCC basis precisely because the former is bereft of ‘extraneous’ conversations 
on internal politics.  
And yet, again, the Gulf’s internal politics present real dilemmas, of high and evolving 
significance for European energy interests. In Saudi Arabia experts argue that the internal 
                                                      
29 Commission of the European Communities, An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests, 
Paper from the Commission/SG/HR for the European Council, 2006 
30 Aurèlia Mañé Estrada, Argelia: ¿retorno al nacionalismo energético?, ARI No. 100, Real Instituto, 
Elcano, Madrid, September 2006, p.5. 12 | RICHARD YOUNGS 
politics of the royal family are increasingly the source of unpredictable decision-making.
31 A 
source of popular anger is precisely the fact that oil revenues flow directly into the royal budget, 
with no accountability. The regime scaled back its market-opening National Gas Initiative 
because it feared the political consequences of any significant liberalisation.
32 I t  i s  e v e n  
rumoured that the Saudi National Guard has itself been implicated in attacks on foreign 
compounds and oil installations. With the intertwining of the Saudi state and Wahhibism 
persisting, experts argue that international energy interests cannot be divorced from a complex 
process of internal social and political change.
33  
In Iran European diplomats stress that their approach is to ‘keep out of politics’ and rather try 
to improve governance conditions to help with oil and gas extraction. Yet the European offer of 
technical energy cooperation as an incentive to Iran looks incongruous alongside the ways in 
which an increasingly less pluralistic Iranian political system impinges on the possibility of such 
cooperation. Iran suffers from an increasing shortfall in energy sector investment that many see 
as related to the nature of its political system. Iran has been unable to meet its own OPEC oil 
production quotas since prices rose after 2003. Indeed, it is still a net importer of gas. Despite 
sitting on 10% of the world’s oil reserves, in March 2007 the Iranian government had to ration 
domestic petrol use. President Ahmadinejad’s raiding of the oil investment fund for short-term 
populist measures draws resources away from the long-term development of the energy sector. 
One reason for the limited opening of the energy sector is the Revolutionary Guards’ 
determination to sew up energy contracts for their own operators.
34 Despite all this, European 
support for rule of law and governance improvements has been sacrificed to the effort to keep 
nuclear negotiations alive. And concerns over Iran’s internal political evolution are absent from 
European energy calculations.  
Similarly in the Caspian and Central Asia, Commission aid priorities are technical assistance 
for reform of energy policies; improving the investment climate in the energy sector; and 
support for pipeline monitoring and other technical energy services. Two formal funding 
programmes, Traceca and Inogate (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), have increased 
funding for infrastructure and pipeline development, respectively.
35 The Baku Initiative has 
agreed a new Energy Road Map, with commitments to enhance energy cooperation on both 
infrastructure and regulatory convergence.  
But scepticism prevails in the region over the impact of such projects in the absence of a 
broader approach to the region’s political and security challenges.
36 Some EU programmes in 
this region have indeed focused on governance, security and trafficking issues. But in general 
the wider political focus remains limited. Indeed, diplomats welcomed the bilateral energy 
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partnerships offered to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan because they delinked energy from the 
democracy and human rights strictures of the ENP. Since President Niyazov’s death in 
December 2006 European leaders have been silent about the undemocratic nature of 
Turkmenistan’s transition, with many ministers and officials openly hoping that the long-
blocked Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with this potentially major gas supplier can 
now be implemented and that the new regime will be more amenable to cooperating on energy 
matters.  
The nepotism of Central Asian regimes might sometimes be made to work to the benefit of 
European oil companies – this is particularly the case in Kazakhstan. But it is also an umbilical 
cord that works against efforts to delink the region from Russia. In Kazakhstan access 
conditions have been toughened to allow FDI only in Kazakh-controlled joint ventures.
37 The 
fact that the oil fund is run by Nazarbayev cronies and used as a patronage fund is increasingly 
the source of public discontent. Some EU officials express concern that Nazarbayev is 
increasingly set on emulating Vladimir Putin, using high energy prices as the basis for assertive 
foreign policy, while attempting to drive wedges between EU member states. 
In Azerbaijan the state oil company, Socar, and decisions affecting anything related to oil 
remain firmly under the control of the Aliyev family, with often unpredictable consequences for 
European investors. The Commission has allocated funds under the ENPI for governance 
projects in Azerbaijan. But at the same time the EU has failed to address the broader 
deterioration of democratic rights in Azerbaijan – as witnessed by a tightly manipulated 
presidential election at the end of 2005 and the subsequent arrest of many opposition figures. 
Similarly, while several EU member states seek to remove all post-Andijan sanctions against 
Uzbekistan, President Karimov increasingly distributes energy contracts and revenues to shore 
up his regime, and to the disadvantage of Western firms, rather than investing in long-term 
capacity increases.
38 
As pointed out, there is certainly no lack of political engagement or geo-strategic lead towards 
Russia. But, even here the EU has attempted to separate energy cooperation from concerns over 
Russia’s internal political evolution. Russia’s drift into authoritarianism is integrally linked to 
two developments of profound significance for European energy interests. First, Putin’s 
centralisation of power at home is of a piece with his attempt to re-establish Russian influence 
abroad. Experts highlight that Russia’s assertive energy diplomacy cannot be delinked from the 
abuse of good governance and market principles internally.
39 Second, the intermeshing of 
political and economic power has deepened under Putin. While some argue that this has done 
little harm to EU investors – and indeed has restored stability after the chaos of the Yeltsin era
40 
– the effective renationalisation of international energy projects suggests otherwise. In the wake 
of Shell and BP being forced to cede control over their Sakhalin II and Kovykta investments, 
respectively, Total has been offered a similar model of limited technical participation in the 
Shtokman gas field. Many observers link the strengthening of the Kremlin’s political control to 
decreases in oil and gas production. An increasing lack of transparency means that it is not even 
clear at what levels Russian reserves and production levels actually stand. 
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Despite all this, in practice the EU has kept the political level separate from the slowly 
accumulating technical and regulatory cooperation between Europe and Russia. The report of 
the seventh annual round of the EU-Russia energy dialogue, held in November 2006, talks of 
advances on technical issues, without mentioning any of the high politics contretemps occurring 
at the very same moment.
41 Detailed work on the integration of Russian and European 
electricity markets is said to be advancing.  
Leading Austria’s EU presidency, Wolfgang Schüssel clarified his view at an EU-Russia 
summit in May 2006 that, “buying and selling oil and gas is a purely commercial activity; it is 
not politics”.
42 A majority bloc of member states has diluted criticism of Putin, as is well 
known. Governance projects have been scaled down. Those that continue are said to run with 
the grain of Putin’s commitment to rule of law and administrative reform – a judgement that 
looks, at best, highly charitable. Policy-makers concede that EU-Russia Human Rights 
Consultations have been ineffective and devoid of meaningful pressure and Russian NGO 
participation. Officials are even minded to argue that if any form of political engagement is key 
for energy security it is the need for European governments to join with Russia to push the 
United States to reduce carbon emissions, not for the EU to join the US to press Russia on 
democratic abuses.  This disconnect is to some extent being revisited after the episodes with 
Shell and BP. But the EU has still failed to define a common and coherent policy towards 
Russian internal politics as part of its energy security strategy. 
In principle the situation in Africa would appear to be different. Here European policy-makers 
lay greater stress than in other regions on energy interests being linked to a broader overall 
political and security engagement. However, this wider European security engagement in 
practice remains relatively modest. Indeed, the EU’s focus on the foreign policy dimensions of 
energy within its Africa policies has lagged behind even that of other producer regions.  
Nigeria provides perhaps the most striking illustration of the dearth of European political 
engagement. Despite undergoing democratic transition and being of increasing importance for 
energy interests, the overall European involvement in Nigeria remains limited. Nigeria is 
Africa’s most under-funded state in terms of its ODA/GNP ratio. The European Commission 
and the British government are the only two European donors of any meaningful size. Funding 
that has been forthcoming has been oriented towards support for government institutions. 
European governments saw President Obasanjo as a guarantor of stability and reform during his 
two terms in office. For one critic, EU detachment is explained by the fact that the oil illegally 
bunkered in Nigeria increasingly finds its way to Europe anyway.
43 
This sanguine stance has increasingly been revealed as insufficient. The government of 
President Obasanjo introduced various schemes to increase investment in infrastructure in the 
Delta, but resources were siphoned off through corruption and most projects failed. Progress 
was made on the transparency of energy-related payments under the Nigerian EITI, but the 
latter became less effective as it was used as Obasanjo’s personal political vehicle.
44 Rather than 
embedding the rule of law, the Nigerian government has sought to buy off militants in the Delta 
with oil contracts and government positions, providing incentive for a perpetuation of violence.  
                                                      
41 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue Seventh Progress Report, November 2006. 
42 At press conference following the 17
th EU-Russia summit, Sochi, 25 May 2006, reported in CEPS 
Neighbourhood Watch, Issue 16, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, May 2006, p. 5. 
43 Nicholas Shaxson, Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007, p. 202. 
44 For a comprehensive account of the dynamics of conflict in the Delta, see ICG, Fuelling the Niger 
Delta Crisis, Africa Report No. 118, International Crisis Group, Brussels, September 2006. EUROPE’S EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY | 15 
In his final months in office in 2007, the president doled out licensing offers for 45 oil blocks to 
political cronies. In the last 18 months of his term, he did not award a single contract to a 
European oil major. The manipulation of the April 2007 elections, that secured a shoe-in for 
Obasanjo’s ruling-party anointed successor, Umaru Yar’Adua, has inflamed discontent even 
further. EU monitors did criticise the April poll as the worst they had witnessed. And some 
European – and especially UK Department for International Development (DfID) – projects 
have sought to address such governance woes. But overall European policy has barely shifted 
gear as Nigeria’s impact on international energy has intensified and its internal fragility 
deepened. The European Parliament berates EU governments for resuming ‘business as usual’ 
after April’s elections.  
5. Conclusion 
The EU has moved in the last three years to deepen energy cooperation and put in place 
important new external energy partnerships. Energy security clearly forms part of the foreign 
policy calculus in a way that it did not five years ago. The notion most strongly espoused has 
been the (familiar) one of the EU’s internal market constituting the basis and principles of 
Europe’s external projection and influence. And this is not entirely without substance, 
representing a useful foundation from which a more effective energy security policy can be 
coordinated. But the common ‘market-governance’ discourse masks persistent and serious 
doubts and differences, especially over the extent to which the internal market should be guided 
by states and deployed in a politically conditioned fashion. While policy-makers proclaim a 
governance-led approach to energy security, in practice the reach of this supposedly basic tenet 
of external energy strategy remains uncertain.  
Differences over internal market liberalisation are well-known and receive wide attention. This 
paper stresses how such differences have increasingly filtered into debates over the foreign 
policy dimensions to energy security. If it is true that external ‘compliance’ is more likely where 
the internal aquis is ‘thicker’,
45 it is clear how divergences over internal energy policy have 
undermined external energy strategy. Given the combination of internal differences and 
producer states’ resistance to the market-governance nexus, the temptation has been to fall back 
on a) apolitical, technical energy cooperation and b) bilateral deals. 
The EU needs to move beyond its dichotomised debate over ‘market versus geopolitics’. A far 
more political approach is required, itself to frame market-based policies. In private most 
policy-makers recognise that the results of the array of EU energy dialogues with producer 
states have been meagre and progress limited to narrow technical issues. The EU needs to 
extend its work on technocratic norms to embrace a more holistic focus on the broader political 
governance of producer state regimes. The need across different regions is to appreciate how the 
broader politics of energy rebounds on European interests in complex ways. This not only 
involves realising that backing ‘friendly autocrats’ rarely optimises energy security in its 
broadest concept. It also requires policy-makers to question their tendency to consider only a 
narrow range of governance issues directly within the energy sphere.  
At present EU policy does indeed hover ineffectively ‘between the market and geopolitics’. It 
needs instead a means of conjoining markets and politics as mutually-conditioned parts of 
comprehensive energy security. Until this happens, energy policy may extend its reach as a self-
contained sectoral policy issue, but will not have been sufficiently and systematically 
incorporated into European foreign and security policy. 
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events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.